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This paper provides an overview of the evolution of income inequality in China from 1987 to 2002, 
employing three series of data sets. Our focus is on both urban and rural inequality, as well as the urban-
rural gap, with the objective of summarizing several “first-order” empirical patterns concerning the 
trajectory of inequality through the reform period. We document significant increases of inequality within 
China’s urban and rural populations. In rural areas, increased inequality is primarily related to the dis-
equalizing role of non-agricultural self-employment income and slow growth in agricultural income from 
the mid-1990s onward.  Poverty persists, and tied in part to slow growth in agricultural commodity prices. 
In urban areas, the declining role of subsidies and entitlements, the increase in wage inequality and the 
layoffs during restructuring, have fueled the growth in inequality within urban areas.  Poverty levels, 
however, are very low. We find that spatial (regional) dimensions of inequality are significant, but are 
much less important than commonly believed for both the urban and rural populations, and for differences 
between urban and rural areas. Accounting for urban-rural reclassification, which otherwise exaggerates 
the rising urban-rural gap, we find a relatively stable ratio of urban to rural incomes. This hides some 
geographical variation, however: The urban-rural gap is increasing more rapidly in interior provinces, 
where SOE’s had a more dominant role in economic activity in urban areas, than in coastal provinces 
where the non-state sector was more important earlier in the reform period.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
  The primary motivation for China’s economic reforms was to increase economic growth, and 
raise living standards after nearly twenty years of stagnation. Given the move to more market-based 
income determination, the reforms had the potential to conflict with inherited egalitarian-motivated 
socialist institutions and rhetoric. To what extent have the reforms led to widening inequality? Who have 
been the winners and losers? Have the reductions in poverty that accompanied growth been sufficient to 
alleviate concerns over inequality? Do increases in inequality threaten the long-run sustainability of the 
reforms? Are there identifiable patterns in the evolution of the income distribution that suggest potential 
policy responses? 
  The objective of this chapter is to document the evolution of inequality, and the income 
distribution more generally, during the reform period, and where possible to draw conclusions concerning 
the role that transition has played in increasing inequality. The centerpiece of our paper is the assembly of 
three series of cross-section data sets that allow a relatively consistent calculation of inequality from the 
mid-1980s onwards. It turns out that establishing “first-order” facts about Chinese inequality is quite 
difficult, and that unfortunately, conclusions hinge on mundane (but important) issues of measurement 
and data quality. In this regard, we are handicapped by the fact that much of the household level survey 
data collected annually by China’s National Bureau of Statistics are not in the public domain.  
  Several of our conclusions line up with the existing literature on inequality in China.  First, 
overall inequality has unambiguously risen in China, even since 1987, the first year for which we have 
data and several years after the reforms began. This inequality has increased in both urban and rural 
China, though as far as we can tell, the increase is higher in urban China.  But, most of our evidence also 
suggests that the “official” estimates of inequality are probably too low, with the true Gini probably in the 
0.40 to 0.50 range for both urban and rural areas. The overall (combined urban-rural) Gini probably 
exceeds 0.50, which is comparable to levels observed in South America.   
  Second, in urban China, absolute living standards have risen so much that even with rising 
inequality, most of the poverty (or “low income,” more accurately) has been eliminated, at least if 
someone uses a “reasonable” benchmark. In rural China, significant gains in income growth during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s resulting from the introduction of HRS pulled tens of millions out of poverty.  
Further reductions occurred through the early-to-mid 1990s, but there was deterioration the last half of the 
1990s, that may have reversed in only the last year or two. There remain reasons for concern, at least as 
far as our data show: for a significant number of households, incomes have remained flat or fallen for a 
decade or more, and the very poor may be worse off.   
  In a number of key respects, however, our findings are at odds with some of the conventional 
wisdom.  Overall, geography, as captured by the province or village/city one lives in, plays a much less Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 2 
important role than one might expect: at least half, and perhaps as much as two-thirds, of estimated 
inequality is driven by income differences between “neighbors” as opposed to income differences based 
on location (city or village).  The role of provincial differences is even smaller.  
  The same is true for urban-rural differences. Although urban incomes may be on average two-
thirds to three-quarters higher than rural incomes, these differences are the source of a relatively small 
proportion of overall inequality in China. More generally, great care must be taken when interpreting 
“urban-rural” income gaps, especially using official (NBS) data: the accelerating reclassification of rural 
areas as urban tends to exaggerate rural-urban income differences, as fast growing rural areas are re-
labeled as urban. Moreover, significant differences in the cost of living between urban and rural dampen 
the raw income differentials. 
There does, however, appear to be significant differences in the inequality (and income growth) 
dynamics between interior and coastal provinces. Inequality increased more rapidly in the interior 
provinces, a product of a more rapid increase in rural income inequality, and a widening urban-rural 
income differential. As suggested by related research on growth and structural transformation by Brandt, 
Hsieh and Zhu (2005), some of this can be linked to the more significant legacy of the state sector in the 
interior provinces and urban bias. In the more dynamic coastal provinces, more rapid job growth in the 
non-state sector helped reduce urban-rural differentials by fostering more rapid rural income growth, and 
simultaneously helped to keep increases in rural inequality down. 
  Our findings regarding the role of geography and urban-rural differences suggest that we need to 
focus more attention on the institutions influencing the distribution of endowments, including both human 
and physical capital, the allocation of factors of production, and factor returns.  In the countryside, most 
of the level and growth of inequality is due to unequal access to non-farm family business income. In the 
cities, the decline in subsidies and unequal wage incomes are playing an increasing role in raising 
inequality.  Increasing returns to higher education are very important in explaining growing dispersion of 
wage earnings. Our results from both urban and rural samples thus underscore the important role likely to 
be played by education in determining the future evolution of the income distribution, even though the 
exact channels may be different in cities and the countryside. 
  Finally, notable by its absence in much of the discussion, is the current role played by a social 
safety net in providing a floor on incomes, and thus some limit on inequality. In the cities, while they may 
be in their infancy or under development, China has yet to develop the array of social policies with the 
breadth and level of other transition economies.  In rural areas the primary safety net has been the 
egalitarian land allocation mechanism, effectively guaranteeing land to all rural households. As it turns 
out, the income associated with the farm income generated by this land is not enough to buffer households Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 3 
from poverty, at least when crop prices are low. None of this is to diminish the otherwise significant 
contribution that market reforms have made to raise overall living standards. 
  Our chapter is divided into five sections. In the next section (Section 2) we provide background 
discussion concerning the measurement of inequality. It is important to draw linkages between the 
distribution of welfare – which is what we are really interested in – and summary statistics of the income 
distribution (like the Gini coefficient). We also briefly outline the factors that we expect would contribute 
to changing inequality through the reform period. In Section 3 we sketch the three data sets that we use. 
One of the features of research in income inequality in China is uneven access to a common publicly 
available, nationally representative data set. Our study, like most others, uses data sets that are highly 
informative of trends in income distribution, but the limitations (e.g. coverage) and definitions need to be 
presented. Our main empirical results are presented in Sections 4 through 6. Throughout we provide 
separate evidence for urban and rural China, beginning with a discussion of the main trends in living 
standards in Section 4. Section 5 focuses on the role of geography: how important are divergent incomes 
across provinces for driving rising inequality? Section 6 takes a closer look at the composition and 
changing structure of income, providing the greatest potential linkage with the factors that may be 
“causing” the increase in inequality, though attribution of any changes to a particular causal factor is 
almost impossible given the scope of change in China over this period. 
 
2.0  Background and Conceptual Issues 
2.1  Summarizing the Income Distribution 
  How much better off is the Chinese population in the year 2000 compared to 1980, after 20 years 
of reform? Clearly it depends on who you are, and there might be one billion different answers. Our 
objective is to find a few numbers to summarize these billion potential answers. There are well-developed 
tools for aggregating the outcomes of a billion people into a single index that permits comparison of 
social welfare, or well-being, over time.
1 Social welfare functions provide an abstract way to rank 
different sets of economic outcomes. Consider a billion people, each of whom has a level of “well-being” 
represented by his or her utility function,  ( ) ii t uc , which assigns a level of utility to their consumption of 
goods and services consumed in period t,  it c . A social welfare function could then assign a single value to 
the resulting distribution of happiness in the population, and will depend on each person’s level of utility. 
While more restrictive, we could ignore the differences across individuals of their preferences, and focus 
instead on the distribution of consumption across the population, defining social welfare as: 
                                                 
1 See Deaton (1997) for a summary of the various conceptual issues, and detailed references, concerning the 
measurement of social welfare, inequality, and poverty. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 4 
( ) 12 , ,..., tt t N t wW c c c =  
The evaluation exercise would thus entail collecting data on the distribution of consumption across the N 
people living in China in 1980, calculating Social Welfare, then comparing this to Social Welfare in 2000, 
based on the distribution of consumption in 2000. The answer would clearly depend on our social welfare 
function. For example, we might evaluate welfare by the overall size of the pie, in which case social 
welfare would depend on the sum of consumption across individuals, or average consumption. 
Alternatively, we might only care about the poorest individual, and our welfare measure would only 
depend on the lowest level of consumption in each year.  
  While the answer to the “big question” thus depends on the social welfare function, a major input 
into evaluating the change in welfare will be the empirical distribution of consumption, or living 
standards,  ( ) 12 , ,..., ttt N t f cc c . In principle, the focus of research should thus be a presentation of summary 
statistics concerning the distribution of consumption. However, we also wish to learn something about 
how economic reforms and the evolution of institutions are linked to living standards. For this reason, 
while we report salient statistics concerning consumption, we focus on income instead. Does it matter? In 
a simple world with no saving or borrowing, consumption would equal income, and choosing between 
income and consumption would come down to advantages of measurement and survey design. With 
saving and borrowing, there are pro’s and cons to using either measure (see Deaton (1997) for a detailed 
discussion). Consumption would probably be the preferred measure, as it is most closely linked to 
economic well-being, and tends to be better measured. However, we are more interested in how the 
income distribution has evolved, since income ultimately “drives” consumption, and it is the structure of 
income that we expect to be most directly affected by the economic reforms. At any event, while there are 
important conceptual issues thus associated with the movement from “welfare” at its most abstract to the 
distribution of income, for any practical purpose, the distribution of income will be a key input in the 
determination of the distribution of welfare. 
  Papers on income distribution in China, including this survey, present a series of summary 
statistics of the income distribution, usually focusing on means and various indices of inequality. Any 
inequality index, like the Gini coefficient, entails a significant distillation of potential information to a 
single number. Setting aside all of the data and sampling issues, it is worth reminding ourselves of the 
limitations associated with summarizing one billion people’s economic outcomes by any single number, 
let alone explaining why that number has changed over time. 
  At a point in time, every man, woman and child in China will earn  it y , from which they can 
support their consumption of goods and services. While we care about individual welfare (and income), 
we will assume that the relevant unit of analysis for economic decision making and welfare determination Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 5 
is the household, and that individual welfare is thus a function of household per capita income. We thus 
wish to summarize the evolution of the distribution of household per capita income,  ht y : 
( ) 12 , ,..., ttt N t g yy y  
  While we will show estimates of the entire distribution,  t g , more commonly we (like other 
researchers) will present only a few salient summary statistics. Mean income,  ht y , provides an estimate of 
the expected income level for a randomly selected household in year t, and allows us to track average 
living standards. There are several ways to summarize the degree to which improvements in living 
standards are being shared. One way would be to choose a common benchmark, and see how many 
households had incomes rise above this benchmark. One benchmark would be a poverty-line. We could 
then compare the probability of being poor in 1980 to 2000. While useful, such a measure focuses only on 
the poor, telling us nothing about the non-poor, whether they be rich or almost poor. If average incomes 
are rising, and inequality is constant, we would expect poverty to fall. But poverty could easily fall while 
income inequality is rising, as long as average income levels are rising enough. For this reason we also 
want to summarize inequality. Our most common measure, reflecting the existing literature, is the Gini 
Coefficient. The Gini depends on the expected absolute difference in incomes between two randomly 
selected Chinese residents:  it jt yy − , and thus captures one dimension of dispersion of incomes. 
Understanding the evolution of mean per capita income and the Gini, with an occasional look at poverty, 
will thus provide most of the first order statistics necessary for an evaluation of the distribution of living 
standards during reforms. 
 
2.2  Explaining the rise in inequality 
  It should come as no surprise that inequality rose as China moved from an ostensibly egalitarian 
socialist economy to a more market-oriented one. What is striking is how high inequality has become. 
Why did this happen? Are there any reasons to believe that the trends will abate? It is almost impossible 
to provide precise, confident answers to those questions at this point. However, we can identify a variety 
of factors associated with the rise in inequality, as well as describe many of the institutional changes that 
may be related. Understanding the distribution of income (or its changes) requires an understanding of the 
determinants of household income for everyone in the country. While this is a tall order, we can begin 
with a highly stylized expositional model of income determination at a point in time. 
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where  jh x  is a household productive characteristic, like the level of education of the father, the time 
available to work of the mother, or the amount of land it has. The value, or “price,” of this factor is given 
by  jh w , and determines how much income is generated by the father’s education, the mother’s work time, 
and household’s land. These prices depend on a host of other variables, some of which will vary across 
households, and others which may be similar for households in the same village or city. 
  Between 1980 and 2000 we expect household income to change. It may change along with 
household endowments of productive factors: maybe education levels are increasing. However, the main 
changes probably occur in factor prices, or the returns to productive characteristics. Economic reforms 
were designed to change institutions that determined factor prices, and there is thus a mapping between 
institutional evolution, factor prices, and the increase in income inequality. We now briefly sketch the 
most important institutional and economic changes that we expect would lead to rising inequality. 
 
2.3  Inequality on the eve of reform 
  The evolution of inequality over the course of China’s economic reform cannot be analyzed 
without some sense of the inequality at the baseline “before” reform. We are however severely 
constrained in this exercise by data limitations: most data were collected after the reforms were well 
underway. However, we can sketch a picture of inequality and its likely sources in urban and rural areas 
separately, and overall.  From there we can speculate as to how reforms would lead to a different 
distribution of income. 
  Prior to reform, nearly eighty percent of China’s population lived in rural areas and was primarily 
involved in agriculture. Land was collectively farmed, with income supplemented in some periods by 
income from small private plots.
2  Income from collective farming was allocated at the level of the 
production team (25 to 30 households) on the basis of both household need and accumulated work points, 
with the weight between “distribution on the basis of need” and “basis of labor” differing across localities 
and shifting over time.  Overall, differences within localities between households were probably relatively 
small, and largely associated with differences among households in dependency ratios, i.e., the ratio of the 
number of individuals that worked to total household size. A host of services (health, education and 
welfare) were also collectively provided, which was probably equalizing. In the language of “prices” and 
“productive endowments”, income (and a household’s standard of living) was less sensitive to 
productivity than would likely be the case after the reforms were started. 
                                                 
2 Very little information exists on differences between or within localities on income earned by households from 
their private plots. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 7 
  But there was not perfect equality in rural China. There were differences across localities and 
regions reflecting differences in endowments and natural conditions. These differences were also 
exacerbated by policies of local grain self-sufficiency which helped limit re-distribution across regions. 
Vermeer (1982) suggests that income differences (of the portion that was collectively distributed) 
between richest and poorest communes (townships) may have been as high as 6:1. There was also 
considerable poverty in rural areas, with as many as a quarter or more of the rural population living 
below, an admittedly low, government-defined poverty line prior to reform (1977 or so).  There was a 
significant geographic component to this poverty as well, with the majority of the poor located in the 
provinces situated in China’s western provinces, running from Gansu and Ningxia, through Sichuan and 
to the southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. 
  Incomes in urban areas consisted largely of wage earnings, and a host of subsidies and 
entitlements that were publicly financed but allocated by work units. Almost everyone worked in state-
owned enterprises, characterized by a compressed wage distribution, relatively weak material incentives, 
and low returns to human capital. Differences in the standard of living between households in the same 
city were further limited by the rationing of many consumer goods, e.g. grain, housing, on the basis of 
need.  Regional wage and income differences in the cities were reportedly modest and may have reflected 
differences in the cost of living, e.g., the cost of living was reportedly higher in Shanghai. Like the 
countryside, some of the largest differences between households were probably related to differences 
across households in their demographic composition and dependency ratios. Party members, who made 
up five percent or so of the population, may have also been entitled to preferential access to scarce goods 
and resources. 
  There was however a sizeable urban-rural income gap that was enforced through strict restrictions 
on migration from the countryside. Through the last half of the 1960s, and 1970s, the urban population 
did not grow much in absolute terms.  Factoring in the value of a host of subsidies, Rawski (1982) 
suggests that on the eve of economic reform, average differences between the city and the countryside 
were on the order of 5:1 or 6:1, or twice that calculated excluding all of the subsidies. The gap with 
respect to rationed commodities was much smaller (Lardy, 1984), and a significant portion of the gap may 
have taken the form of higher urban-savings. 
  In summary, our impression of inequality before reforms is of relatively low inequality within 
villages and cities, a stronger regional dimension to inequality in rural areas, and a pronounced urban-
rural gap. 
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2.4  Transition versus development 
  While we can notionally decompose the change in income distribution to changes in the 
distribution of productive factors and their rewards, it is also important to recognize there are two broad, 
somewhat distinct, sources of these changes: transition and development.  As detailed above, prior to 
reform, prices, including wages, and resource allocation were primarily administratively determined. 
Household income was determined by a set of “local” socialist institutions that mapped a household’s 
endowment, largely consisting of labor or human capital, into income.  These same institutions affected 
the ownership, distribution and accumulation of other forms of capital by households, such as land or 
physical capital.  
  Transition as a process entails moving to market determination of the valuation of productive 
endowments, and incomes. In a perfectly competitive world, incomes would be a simple product of a 
household’s endowments and the market-determined returns to these factors. The introduction of the 
market affects the returns and rewards to the factors of production, for example, entrepreneurial ability 
and human capital. It also affects the distribution and accumulation of these same factors, though this 
process would take longer. Even in a stagnant, stationary world we would expect a change in factor prices 
moving from a socialist to market-oriented economy. 
  Overlaid with transition – and through no coincidence – China experienced economic 
development at the same time. The process of economic development and growth will also affect the 
returns to and distribution of factors of production in a way that matters for income distribution. For 
example, development may alter the relative returns of labor to capital, or increase the returns to human 
capital and other kinds of skills. 
  This discussion highlights the importance of distinguishing a “transition” effect from a 
development, or growth effect, at least conceptually.
3  In actuality, it is impossible to separately identify 
these effects. However, we can use the distinction as an organizing principle for highlighting the factors 
we believe have been at play in three primary dimensions. These relate to the urban and rural sectors 
separately, and finally urban-rural income differences. 
 
2.4.1   Urban Inequality 
  The evolution of income inequality in Chinese cities would have likely mirrored the experience in 
eastern European transition economies. First, liberalization in the labor market – even within the state 
sector – would have led to greater wage inequality. More successful enterprises could pass profits to 
workers through bonuses and higher base wages, so that wage inequality would rise across industrial 
sectors and across firms. Second, food and housing subsidies were slashed in the early 1990s. These 
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important forms of in-kind income were likely very equally distributed, especially compared to the 
straight wages that (in principle) replaced them. Third, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, the end of 
the “iron rice bowl” in the latter half of the 1990’s led to significant layoffs, unemployment, and at least 
short-term inequality of access to jobs. 
  On top of these more transition-oriented changes, urban China was considerably affected by the 
development of a vibrant private industrial and service sector, with wage and employment determination 
entirely outside the old Socialist labor bureaus. As in any globalized developing economy experiencing 
significant technological change, we might expect dramatic changes in the returns to human capital and 
skill, which would transmit to higher inequality of earnings and income. 
 
2.4.2 Rural  Inequality 
  The Household Responsibility System (HRS) immediately permitted households to retain a 
greater share of the returns to their own labor and entrepreneurial talent in managing their farms. 
Liberalization with respect to farm sidelines and the establishment of family run businesses provided 
another avenue for households to potentially earn more than their neighbors. At the same time, land 
remained owned by the village and was allocated to households on a fairly egalitarian basis, so there was 
a limit to how much inequality could arise from farm incomes. The establishment of Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVE’s), and the development of off-farm opportunities more generally, would likely 
have also provided households a way to earn a living off the farm, potentially generating greater 
differences in income across villages. While it was difficult to move from the country to the city, it was 
easier to move shorter distances within the countryside. These opportunities for limited migration would 
also have significantly changed the structure of income for households. It is difficult to predict whether 
this would increase income inequality, as it would depend on whether these opportunities were available 
throughout the income distribution. 
  Alongside the transition from collectivized agriculture, households in rural China also faced 
increasing integration with the broader Chinese economy, as well as international markets. For farmers, 
this generated changing terms of trade between agricultural and non-agricultural goods. Over the period 
of reform, especially in the latter half of the 1990’s, agricultural prices declined significantly, lowering 
the floor provided by crop incomes, and potentially leading to a rise of inequality. Similar to the cities, 
industrialization and development would also have provided rising returns to human capital and skill, 
leading to higher income inequality. To the extent this development was uneven across provinces, it 
might also lead to widening income gaps across regions. 
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2.4.3 Urban-Rural  Gap 
  What would we expect to happen to the ratio of urban to rural incomes? From a pure transition 
perspective, we might expect the gap to narrow. First, the declining support of the state sector, and the 
end of urban food subsidies would potentially serve to reduce the heavy urban bias of government 
expenditure. However, these changes may have happened too slowly to matter before 2000. Through 
most of this period there also remained considerable restrictions on migration through the “hukou” 
system. While these restrictions ended recently, the constraints on mobility would have reduced the 
convergence of rural-urban incomes. To a limited extent, however, improvements in product and factor 
market linkages should have served to reduce the urban-rural gap. In the end, the evolution of the rural-
urban gap depends on the relative growth rates, or development, of industrial and service sectors. To the 
extent that such development was concentrated in cities—possibly because of pre-existing or continuing 
advantages of infrastructure like schools and roads—we would expect average incomes of urban residents 
to grow faster than those of rural residents. And given that factor mobility remains imperfect, the urban-
rural income gap could easily rise through the reform period. 
 
In summary, there are several potential reasons why we would expect the overall level of income 
inequality in China to increase: It should increase within both the urban and rural sectors, and possibly 




3.1   The data sources 
  Access to well-designed, nationally representative household survey data is essential to 
measuring changes in the level and distribution of economic welfare. Lacking such a single data set, we 
draw heavily on three primary household level data sets in our analysis. For the urban areas, we obtained 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) urban household surveys for a sub-sample of provinces including 
Jilin, Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Hubei, Shangdong, Shanghai, and Guangdong.  This survey has income 
and consumption measures with relatively comparable definitions for all years. We use the “income” and 
“consumption” variables as defined by the NBS, and included in the micro-data. These data are not 
without serious shortcomings. On the income side, the implicit value of subsidies associated with, for 
example, food coupons, is missing.  These were especially important through the 1980s, but were 
eliminated in the early 1990s. On the consumption side, the data do not provide an easy way to measure 
the value of services from consumption durables, notably, housing. One other issue worth noting is that 
the urban data are sampled on the basis of urban household registration. This means that rural-registered Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 11 
migrants living in the cities are not enumerated, and this may have significant consequences for 
interpretation of urban incomes and inequality. 
  Our primary rural data are a series of annual household surveys conducted by the Survey 
Department of the Research Center on the Rural Economy (RCRE) in Beijing. We use household-level 
surveys covering over 100 villages in 9 provinces including Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, Sichuan, Gansu. The survey spans the period 1986 to 2002, and includes between 7,000 and 
8,000 households per year. The RCRE originally was intended as a longitudinal survey, following the 
same households over time. While there is a household-level panel dimension to our sample, we observe 
considerable attrition of households over the 1986-2002 period, especially after years when there was no 
survey. The RCRE was unable to conduct the survey in 1992 and 1994 because of funding difficulties. 
Households lost through attrition were replaced on the basis of random sampling. 
  The survey collected detailed household-level information on incomes and expenditures, 
education, labor supply, asset ownership, land holdings, savings, formal and informal access to credit, and 
remittances.  That said, the construction of consistent income and consumption measures is quite tricky, 
especially in calculating self-supplied consumption, and the implicit flow of durables and housing 
consumption. Of particular importance for our purposes, especially investigating the role of geographic 
factors for inequality, we are able to track a panel of villages, even where there has been household 
attrition. This allows us to maintain geographic comparability over the complete time period.  
  The China Health and Nutrition Study (CHNS) data uniquely allow us to pool urban and rural 
households. This survey covers the provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Shandong, Jiansu, Guangxi, Guizhou for five years: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2000. Because of some 
non-comparability issues with the 1989 survey, we only use the 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2000 data. The 
CHNS survey is more intensive than either the NBS or RCRE surveys. The survey provides better 
coverage of urban subsidies, and we believe that some sources of income – especially from non-farm self-
employment – are better measured than the other surveys. Certainly, there is more detail that can be 
exploited when exploring the robustness of conclusions to definitions of “income.” The CHNS does not 
have consumption or expenditure data, however. One especially important feature of the CHNS is that it 
(essentially) follows a panel of cities and villages across the survey years. We are also able to evaluate the 
sensitivity of urban-rural differences to the definition of “urban.” This is potentially very important when 
interpreting “urban and rural” results based on NBS data, where fast growing and industrializing rural 
areas are re-classified as urban over the transition period. 
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3.2   Issues Common to All Data sets 
  There are a number of important measurement issues that need to be discussed when looking at 
any series of inequality measures. The estimated level of inequality can be sensitive to the definitions of 
income and consumption, even from perfectly implemented and comparable household surveys. Once we 
admit that surveys are neither perfectly implemented nor perfectly comparable, it becomes even more 
important to be clear how income and consumption are defined and measured. Even a simple question of 
how to turn household income into per capita measures can be problematic: who is a household member? 
In the Chinese context, should the member be defined on the basis of his or her registration status? Or, 
like the World Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys, on the basis of economic attachment to the 
household? Should adjustments be made for the age composition of the household, i.e., should we convert 
household size into adult equivalents? 
  In the numbers that follow, we use the “best” available measure from each survey. For urban 
households in the NBS survey, income is defined as income earned from all enumerated sources, and 
household size is based on registration. For the rural RCRE households, we calculate income from all 
sources, including the implied market value of home produced grain. Measurement of farm incomes in 
China can be highly sensitive to a battery of assumptions concerning valuation, and we discuss these 
issues more thoroughly elsewhere (Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles 2005). These measurement issues 
become especially important when comparing RCRE-based results to those from the NBS, such as those 
reported by Ravallion and Chen (2004). Household membership in the RCRE is also based on 
registration. For the CHNS, we construct incomes along similar lines to the respective urban and rural 
surveys. For urban households in the CHNS we are also able to “value” the implicit rents associated with 
access to food and housing at below-market prices. With the CHNS, however, household membership is 
defined more on the basis of economic attachment (residency) than registration. Household members 
other than the head who work and live outside much of the year may not be included (though their 
remittances would be). 
  In principal, households to be surveyed are to be drawn from a representative cross-section of the 
population. If not, the researcher must know the sampling weights for purposes of making inferences 
about the population. In the case of the surveys carried out by both the NBS and RCRE, there is reason to 
believe that a disproportionate number of households at both ends of the income distribution, i.e. the very 
rich and the very poor, are being excluded. In part, this reflects the fact that survey protocol requires 
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households difficult, and the costs associated with record keeping for the rich high. Truncation of this sort 
likely leads to an underestimate of income inequality and poverty.
4    
  A final issue worth mentioning concerns the conversion of nominal values into constant-dollar 
(yuan) prices. We use the official provincial CPI’s to convert all nominal values into 1990 yuan.
5   In 
order to make welfare comparisons across heterogeneous provinces, it may also be advantageous to 
control for differences in the cost of living. To accomplish this we use a newly constructed set of spatial 
price deflators, documented in Brandt and Holz (2004). These deflators allow us to adjust for cross-
sectional differences in urban and rural prices across provinces, and between rural and urban areas. In 
general, we expect incomes and price levels to be positively correlated. In urban areas, for example, the 
cost of the same basket of goods is more than fifty percent higher in Guangdong than it is in Sichuan. 
Failure to control for these differences can lead to an overestimate of inequality, and the contribution of 
key sources, e.g. inter-provincial or urban-rural differences. 
 
4.0  The Mean and Dispersion of Income over Time 
 
  In this section we document the first-order results concerning the level and distribution of income 
in China: what were trends in inequality over the transition period? In both urban and rural China, mean 
incomes rose significantly over the reform period, as did income inequality. Below, we provide details on 
how the benefits of reform were shared. 
 
4.1   Urban 
  Table 1 reports the key summary statistics of the evolution of the income distribution for four 
selected years: 1987, 1991, 1995, and 2001. To place these numbers in a broader temporal context, we 
plot the mean and Gini coefficients for all the years for which we have data in Figures 1 and 2. The NBS-
based urban results are in the top panel of Table 1. Mean per capita household income grew from 1533 
yuan in 1987 to more than double at 3411 yuan in 2001, reflecting steady growth of 5.7% per year, as 
illustrated in the top panel of Figure 1. For comparison, Table 2 provides similar numbers based on the 
CHNS, with urban results in the top panel. Even though the underlying provinces, sampling frame, and 
income definitions are different, the urban CHNS paints a similar picture to the NBS. Mean incomes grew 
from 1484 yuan in 1991 to 2532 in 2000. While the level of income is about 20 percent below the NBS, 
                                                 
4 Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005) document this in the case of a comparison of estimates of rural inequality 
using the RCRE data, and several other surveys in which household selection was known to be random. 
5 To help the reader put these real figures into current nominal estimates, the CPI roughly doubled between 1990 and 
2003.  
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the implied growth rate (over the shorter time period) is basically the same, at 5.9% per year. In Figure 1 
(Panel A), we see that the CHNS observations plot a lower, but parallel growth path to the NBS 
observations. Both data sets thus confirm a remarkable improvement in average living standards. 
  How was this growth shared? In the next rows we provide a variety of inequality measures.  
Table 1 shows significant increases in urban inequality as captured by NBS. The Gini Coefficient 
increases by almost two-thirds from 0.22 to 0.34 over this fourteen-year period. As shown in Figure 2, the 
increase in inequality has been quite steady over this time period, with no evidence of a slowing trend. 
Accounting for differences in the cost of living across cities does little to change this picture. The 
spatially-deflated Gini is slightly smaller, but shows similar growth between 1987 and 2001 (0.20 to 
0.33). Other common measures of dispersion confirm that the inequality results are not specific to the 
Gini. Whichever parameter of inequality-aversion is selected, the Atkinson index shows a pronounced 
increase of inequality. The 90-10 ratio also rises pronouncedly by nearly eighty percent from 2.64 to 4.77: 
The “rich” now earn almost five times the poor, as compared to less than three times as much in 1987. 
The robustness of our conclusions to the index of inequality comes as no surprise once we plot the 
corresponding Lorenz curves for urban incomes in Figure 3. Each curve shows the fraction of the total 
income accounted for by the “poorest” households. For any cumulative population’s share of the 
“poorest” individuals (i.e., the poorest 40 percent), we see that their cumulative share of income is lower 
for each passing year: the rich keep getting a bigger slice. These Lorenz curves thus show a clear ordering 
of the income distributions as far as inequality is concerned: each subsequent reported year lies outside 
the previous one. So no matter what inequality index is selected, 2001 will show a higher level of 
inequality than 1995.  
  How representative is our NBS sub-sample of provinces? NBS-reported inequality figures for 
1986 to 2000 using their entire urban sample show a rise in the Gini from 020 to 0.32.
6   To help put the 
rise in inequality after 1987 in perspective, the full NBS sample shows an increase in inequality from 0.16 
to 0.20 between 1978 and 1986. Clearly, inequality has been rising since the beginning of economic 
reforms. Turning to our comparison with the CHNS in Table 2 (and Figure 2), we see that the CHNS 
estimates consistently imply higher levels of inequality than do the NBS (0.38 for the CHNS in 2000 
versus 0.34 for the NBS in 2001, for example), but a similar increase (in absolute terms) over years in 
common between the two surveys. Estimates from the China Income Project for 1988 and 1995, which 
address a number of important weaknesses in the NBS household survey, also reveal significantly higher 
levels of inequality, but a similar increase over this seven-year period.
7 
                                                 
6 See Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2004) and Ravallion and Chen (2004). 
 
7 See Kahn and Riskin (1998, 1999), for example. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 15 
  To gauge potential trends in poverty, our final distributional measure is the proportion of 
households whose income falls below one-half the 1987 median income. This line is fixed through time, 
providing a benchmark of how many households are raised out of “poverty,” if the poverty line were set 
at 50% of 1987 median income. For 1987, we see a very low proportion of so-defined “poor” households, 
with only 4 percent of households with low income. This proportion declines to only one percent by 2001. 
In Figure 4 we plot the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF’s) for household income. On the 
horizontal axis we show the level of real income, while the vertical axis shows the proportion of 
individuals in households with an income level below that on the horizontal axis. Thus, for any “poverty 
line” we can estimate the proportion poor. For example, if the “poverty line” was a very high 2000 yuan 
(higher than mean incomes in 1987) we would see that fewer than 40 percent had incomes below this 
level in 2001, compared to over 80 percent in 1987. The bottom panel focuses on the bottom part of the 
distribution where we can select more reasonable poverty lines. Half the 1987 median per capita income 
level is approximately 700 yuan. Significantly fewer than 5% of individuals had incomes below this level 
in any of the years, and we can see the fraction steadily declining in each year (as shown in Table 1). 
Higher poverty lines would show similar progress over time. 
  This finding can be compared with more thorough examinations of urban poverty trends by 
Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2004) and Ravallion and Chen (2004), which use the entire NBS sample for 
the period between 1986-2000, and calculate poverty lines using alternative procedures.
8 The estimates of 
Meng, Gregory, and Wang show an uneven rise in the percentage living under poverty from two percent 
to about five percent in 1993, which then declines slowly through 2000.  Ravallion and Chen’s estimate 
also show a downward trend, but slightly more volatility. Despite some differences, there is general 
agreement on the relatively low levels of urban poverty in China based on the NBS estimates. 
  In the final rows of the urban-panel of Table 1, we report the consumption-based mean levels of 
income, and corresponding Gini coefficients. The consumption-based measures mirror the income-based 
ones. For urban China, it thus appears that while income inequality has increased significantly, increases 
in incomes have been large enough, and spread throughout the income distribution, so that almost 
everyone is better off than at the beginning of reforms. 
 
                                                 
8 Ravallion and Chen (2004), for example, use the “official” poverty line of 300 yuan per person per year (in 1990 
prices), as well as a more recently constructed poverty line based on updated minimum consumption bundles: 850 
yuan for rural, and 1200 yuan for urban (in per capita terms). Meng, Gregory, and Wang (2004) also choose poverty 
lines based on minimum consumption bundles, as opposed to our more arbitrary – but still constant – half the 1987 
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4.2 Rural 
  Turning to rural results, we report the distributional characteristics in the bottom panels of Tables 
1 and 2, and Figures 1 and 2. The rural picture is muddier than the urban one, with conflicting evidence 
from different data sets. In Table 1 we report the RCRE-based results. These show unambiguous 
improvements in average living standards, with mean incomes rising from 920 yuan in 1987 to 1244 in 
2001, an increase by about one-third. As shown in Figure 1, this corresponds to an annualized growth rate 
of only 2.0 percent. This is lower than most other data sets, including the CHNS, reported in Table 2. For 
the CHNS, income levels are approximately the same as the RCRE at the beginning of the sample, but 
diverge by 2000: The CHNS-based growth rate is similar to urban areas, at 6.3%. Benjamin, Brandt and 
Giles (2005) provide a detailed discussion and reconciliation of why the RCRE growth rate differs from 
the NBS growth rate, explaining how differences in survey design and interpretation – especially the 
valuation of agricultural output – lead to discrepancies. Concerning the gap between the CHNS and 
RCRE, it is noteworthy that most the difference arises only after the mid-1990s, and is largely attributable 
to differences between the RCRE and CHNS surveys in the rate of growth of farm income. Some of this 
may reflect the kinds of villages that were selected, with more “suburban” villages possibly included in 
the CHNS, as well in how farm output is being valued. The CHNS villages may have had more acreage in 
vegetables and other cash crops, and been less exposed to a sharp drop in grain prices that occurred after 
1995.   
  In the next rows we document the evolution of various measures of inequality. Our estimates 
reveal that inequality is slightly higher in rural than in urban areas, and that rural inequality experienced 
slightly smaller increases over time.  As in our examination of urban inequality, spatially deflating 
incomes leads to lower overall inequality, but a similar trend.  The CHNS data suggest higher inequality 
than do the RCRE data (0.46 in 2000 versus 0.37 in 2001 and 0.39 in 2002, for example), but imply a 
similar absolute increase over the years in common between the two surveys. A comparison with NBS-
based rural inequality estimates (Ravallion and Chen, 2004) shows similar trends, but systematically 
higher levels of inequality in our two surveys. Using the NBS estimates to extrapolate would also put the 
Gini coefficient for rural inequality in 1980 in the vicinity of 0.30.  
  As illustrated in Figure 2, much of the increase in rural inequality in the two rural data sets occurs 
in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and then again beginning in the late 1990s, with inequality actually falling 
in between.  An important reason for this is the behavior of farm prices. Between 1993 and 1995, farm 
procurement prices doubled in nominal terms, and by fifty percent relative to the rural CPI. This 
disproportionately benefited low-income rural households for whom farming was an important source of 
income, and helped to offset the impact on inequality of the rapid growth of non-agricultural incomes. 
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inequality. There was a reversal of fortune for the poorest households in the last half of the 1990s, which 
can be linked to falling farm prices and the behavior of farm incomes. Not until 2002-2003 did farm 
prices and incomes begin to recover. 
  In Tables 1 and 2 we report rural inequality for different inequality indices. As for urban areas, all 
the indices show rising inequality, so our conclusions are not specific to the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz 
curves in Figure 2 also unambiguously show that inequality is higher in 2001 than 1987. However, there 
is a less clean ranking of 1987 and 1995, as the Lorenz curves cross, and essentially lie on top of each 
other over much of the distribution. In principle, this means that inequality comparisons between 1987 
and 1995 may be sensitive to the choice of inequality index. Indeed in Table 1, 1995 is ranked more 
unequal than 1987 for all indices, except the 90-10 ratio. 
  A crucial question for welfare analysis is thus whether the increase in mean incomes was high 
enough to offset the increased dispersion of incomes. While the rich got unambiguously richer, what 
happened to the poor? At the bottom of Table 1 we report the percentage of households below the 1987 
median. These estimates show uneven progress, with a rise in the late 1980s followed by a sharp drop 
through the mid-1990s, but then an increase through the end of the decade. By 2001 only 11 percent of 
households had incomes below one-half the 1987 median income, compared to 16 percent in 1987. Given 
the perception of rapid growth in the country-side, this decline in “poverty” seems disappointing. The 
stagnation in this dimension is a feature of the late 1990’s. Figure 4 shows the CDF’s for rural areas for 
three selected years. Lower CDF’s correspond to “better” income distributions, with fewer individuals 
having incomes below any given level. The 1987 CDF is clearly highest over most levels of income. As 
seen in the bottom panel, however, the CDF’s for all three years are indistinguishable below incomes of 
200 yuan. There are similar – very low – percentages of individuals with incomes this low. The income 
distribution has thus generally improved since 1987. It is less clear comparing the present to 1995. The 
top panel shows that the CDF’s for 1995 and 2001 cross below incomes of 2000 yuan. For incomes below 
1000 yuan per year, the 1995 CDF is lower than for 2001. Thus, even for a very high “poverty line” or 
benchmark, the 1995 income distribution dominates the 2001 distribution. The increase in inequality over 
the 1990’s thus has the poor getting poorer, with a decline in absolute living standards. These results are 
not simply an artifact of the RCRE. The CHNS-based numbers in Table 2 confirm the stagnation of 
incomes of the poor since 1997.  
  It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that economic reforms have entirely missed the poor. 
Part of the problem stems from our use of the RCRE data which only begin in 1986, and fail to capture 
the enormous gains in reducing poverty in the late 1970s and early 1980s following the introduction of 
the Household Responsibility System, and rural reform. Subject to limitations in the NBS data, especially 
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living under poverty fell from 76% in 1980 to 22% by 1987. Most of the gains made by the poor thus 
occurred before the first observation of our RCRE sample. With sixty percent of China’s population still 
classified as rural, these estimates also highlight that much of China’s poverty remains in the countryside. 
And the clear stagnation of rural incomes, especially for those in the bottom half of the distribution, 
suggests little positive news for the short-run prospects for rural poverty alleviation. 
  In the final two rows of the rural panel of Table 1, we report the consumption-based means and 
Gini coefficients, to explore sensitivity of our results focusing on income. While a significant part of the 
consumption is measured independently of income, for the rural data both income and consumption 
contain a common component of self-consumed home-production. Still, it is re-assuring that the 
consumption-based measures show the same trends as the income-based measures. For rural China, 
unlike in the cities, it thus appears that increases in inequality do off-set the otherwise rosy picture painted 
by rising mean incomes, at least for those at the bottom of the income distribution. 
 
5.0  The Role of “Geography” 
 
The role of widening regional income differences and their contribution to increasing inequality 
is a common theme in the literature on inequality in China.
9  Rising disparities between localities, 
especially provinces (inland versus coastal, for example) are often seen as the most important source of 
the rising income differences we just documented, as some provinces are better situated to take advantage 
of market liberalization and reforms related to foreign trade and investment. In rural areas, spatial 
differences may also be present due to differences in per capita land endowments, access to urban 
markets, and initial conditions at the time of the reform (e.g., the level of development of commune and 
brigade-run enterprises). With decline in the importance of restrictions on migration enforced by China’s 
residential registration system (the hukou system), and opening up of markets for migrant labor, however, 
we might expect some degree of regional convergence, and a decline in the “contribution” of region to 
overall inequality. Our samples, which include the rapidly growing coastal provinces of Guangdong and 
Jiangsu and slower growth interior provinces of Sichuan and Gansu, seem reasonably well suited for 
examining these differences and their trends, as well as for understanding the role of geography in 
affecting income inequality more generally. 
 
                                                 
9Kanbur and Zhang (1999) provide an excellent overview of the literature on regional inequality, highlighting inland 
versus coastal, and urban versus rural dimensions.  See also Gustaffson and Li (2002). Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 19 
5.1  Spatial Income Decompositions 
    There are a number of approaches we can take in decomposing inequality across regions. 
Unfortunately, the Gini coefficient is not readily (or neatly) decomposed. Instead, a simple strategy 
entails decomposing the variance of log income (itself an inequality index) by estimating the following 
regression: 
        ln yi = DL′γ +ui      
where  DL is a vector of dummy variables indicating the location of individual i. The R-squared from this 
regression indicates the proportion of the variation (or variance) of  ln yi  that is explained by the location 
dummies. The remainder is the (within-location) residual variance of log income, and a measure of the 
degree to which household income is not explained by the average income of its neighbors.
10   We carry 
out this exercise separately for urban and rural households. 
  Table 3 reports the results of the spatial decomposition using each of our data sets. We define 
location at two-levels of aggregation: the city (or village) and province.  We estimate the above regression 
separately for urban and rural samples, with province and city- (or village-) level dummies. We also 
distinguish between spatially deflated and un-deflated household income, exploring the extent to which 
spatial income differences are attenuated when accounting for differences in the cost of living.
11   
  The first row shows results for urban China, and the fraction of household income differences that 
can be explained by province. In 1987, mean differences in provincial income explained only 26 percent 
of the variation in household income. The majority of inequality was thus due to differences of income 
among households in the same province. Note that this does not mean the effect of location is 
inconsequential: The R-squared from this regression is higher than most human capital earnings 
functions! Province of residence thus explains as much of the variation of income as does age, education, 
and other individual characteristics for individual earnings.
12 The point we wish to emphasize, however, is 
that the majority of income inequality cannot be explained by location. This means that a focus on 
geography as the key driver of rising inequality is misplaced. Local institutions, and differences in the 
characteristics of, or opportunities for, people living in the same community, are more important. 
                                                 
10 For comparability, we also decomposed the Theil Index (which is neatly decomposable), and found similar 
results. 
11 For our extracts of the urban NBS data, the city indicator is only available after 1993. 
12 Consider another “benchmark” for a high or low contribution of geography in a spatial decomposition. We 
replicated this procedure using a Canadian household survey (the 1996 Family Expenditure survey). Even though 
there are significant differences in provincial incomes (for example household per capita income is about 15 percent 
higher in Ontario than Quebec, the two most populous provinces), “Province” only explains 1.5% of the variation in 
log per capita household incomes in Canada: within-province income inequality is 98.5% of Canadian income 
inequality. While low in an absolute sense, the contribution of space to income inequality is thus much higher in 
China than Canada, and probably most other developed countries. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 20 
  Continuing through the first row of Table 3, our estimates suggest an increase in the role of 
province up through the mid-1990s, followed by a decline.  The sharp increase in the first half of the 
1990s may be linked to the elimination of numerous subsidies enjoyed by households, which were less 
than fully compensated in some provinces by an increase in cash wages (Meng, Gregory, and Wang, 
2004).
13   Unexpectedly for us, the massive layoffs in the SOEs, which began in the mid-1990s and had a 
significant regional component, did not result in an increase in the role of spatial differences through 
2001. Less surprising, spatially deflating the data lowers the contribution of “location”, but the trend is 
otherwise very similar.  Overall, a quarter to a third of urban inequality can be linked to the province in 
which a household is located, with a slightly higher percentage (40 to 50 percent) attributable to the city. 
In the bottom panel we report results from the CHNS data. In the CHNS, city and especially province 
play a less prominent role than in the NBS sample, with the role of city declining over time. 
  Turning to the rural sector, aside from a slight increase in the early 1990s, the RCRE data imply a 
fairly steady decline in the role of location in overall inequality. Spatially deflating has an effect similar to 
what we observed in the urban data, and lowers the role of location considerably. By the end of the period 
we are analyzing, both the RCRE and CHNS data suggest that province of residence explains only about 
10 percent, and village between 30-40 percent, of rural inequality.   Most of the inequality in China is 
within the villages and cities in which Chinese households live and work. 
 
5.2  Urban and Rural Inequality 
  So far we have looked at rural and urban inequality in isolation. Yet one important dimension of 
rising inequality may be a widening gap between urban and rural incomes. Certainly, these income 
differences have figured prominently in the literature. Lacking access to the NBS rural household survey 
data, the CHNS is the only data set that allows us to explore “overall inequality,” pooling urban and rural 
samples. The CHNS thus permits a formal decomposition of spatial inequality that includes allowance for 
provincial or urban-rural income gaps. 
  We report summary statistics for the pooled urban and rural sample in Table 4.  Between 1991 
and 2000, real per capita income rose from 1121 RMB (in 1990 prices) to 1912 RMB, which implies an 
annual increase of just slightly less than 6 percent per annum. Perhaps surprisingly, pooling the urban and 
rural samples leads to an overall level of inequality no higher than the rural sample alone. By all 
measures, inequality increased considerably, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.37 to 0.44, and 
the 90-10 ratio rising from 6.93 in 1991 to 11.04 in 2000. The absolute increase in (and level of) 
                                                 
13 An alternative possibility is that the NBS data do not fully capture differences across provinces in earlier years in 
these subsidies, which would  have led to an underestimate in the role of province in the decompositions. 
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inequality is the same as estimated for the rural sector alone, but slightly smaller than the increase 
occurring in the urban sector.  The behavior of the Gini coefficient for this sub-sample of provinces is 
actually identical to that calculated by Ravallion and Chen (2004) using the entire NBS sample, so it is 
unlikely this conclusion is an artifact of the CHNS. 
  In the bottom half of Table 4 we report the results for spatial decompositions that provide 
estimates of the contribution of location and urban-rural differences to overall inequality. The role of 
province and city (village) in overall inequality is similar to our estimates for the urban and rural sectors 
separately using the CHNS.  By the end of the period we are analyzing, the city or village that a 
household lives in only explains about a sixth of the inequality, and province only five percent.   
  Controlling for the role of provincial differences in mean incomes, we also look at the 
contribution of urban-rural income differences to overall inequality: How much do mean differences of 
income between urban and rural households contribute to overall inequality? We do this by including in 
the spatial decomposition regression province dummies, an urban indicator, and interactions between the 
province and urban dummies. The interactions allow the urban-rural gap to vary across provinces. To help 
in the interpretation, the average urban-rural income gap in the CHNS sample (implied in Table 2) is 1.6. 
Combined, province plus the urban-rural distinction explain only about fifteen percent of total inequality, 
or an increase of ten percent over that explained by province alone.  The contribution of these two 
geographic dimensions to total inequality is also relatively constant over the period.  Our estimates imply 
that an average urban-rural income gap of 1.6 is actually responsible for only a small part of the 
inequality in incomes. These results once again point to the significant contribution of differences within 
urban areas and the countryside to current inequality in China. 
  This result is counter to conventional wisdom that rural areas are being left behind. Interpreting 
the behavior of urban-rural income differences can be tricky however, largely because of their sensitivity 
to the definition of “rural.” Many publicly reported urban-rural gaps – especially trends – may be a 
statistical artifact, and driven by systematic selection of poorer areas as “rural.” This is especially 
important in the Chinese context because the NBS-based urban-rural comparisons allow for rural areas to 
be reclassified as urban. If a rural area develops enough, it is “promoted” to urban status. While this 
makes sense at a point in time, it destroys comparability with the past. By construction, the urban-defined 
population is in the faster developing areas, even if a previously defined rural area was developing. This 
serves to select the remaining rural sample from the more “stagnant” areas. Since the late 1970s, the share 
of the Chinese population that is urban has roughly doubled, a major portion of which is the result of 
reclassifying rural areas to urban. We use the CHNS to illustrate these points in Table 5, comparing the 
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  The first definition holds constant a location’s rural-status throughout the period. We use the 
CHNS designation of “rural,” plus “suburban” clusters to construct our first rural indicator. This 
approximately corresponds to a definition based on household registration, i.e. in 1990 households in 
these clusters had rural registration. One important feature of this definition is that the rural-urban status 
is held constant through 2000. So, even if a rural area completely paves over its farms and industrializes, 
it will remain “rural”. This definition allows rural areas to develop, and stay “rural.” The second 
definition is based on economic structure, and is malleable over time. We define localities as rural if most 
of the households are farmers. Specifically, a locality is rural if fifty percent (or more) of the households 
earn fifty percent or more of their income from farming. A village that industrializes between 1991 and 
2000 will thus switch its classification from rural to urban. This isn’t exactly the same as what the NBS 
does, but it mimics similar reclassification procedures. 
  Several findings emerge. First, the urban-rural gap is higher with the second definition, being 
close to two-to-one. This is not surprising, as the “urban” clusters are positively selected on the basis of 
having more developed non-agricultural income sources. The ratio for our first definition is around 1.5. 
Second, with definition one, the urban-gap is generally (and slowly) falling (though there are big year 
effects that cloud the trend). Again, definition one allows “successful”, fast growing rural clusters to 
retain “rural” league status. Systematic reclassification hides the actual convergence that may be 
occurring between town and country. And third, the growth rates are higher for both urban and rural 
under definition one. The “rural” growth rate is less than two thirds as high under definition two, as 
“successful” villages are systematically dropped. The urban growth rate is also lower under the second 
definition (0.046 versus 0.059). This may seem puzzling, except that the relatively rural, formerly “rural” 
clusters are poorer than the originally urban clusters. The newly “promoted” urban clusters continuously 
lower the average “urban” income. In summary, people living in rural areas are keeping up with those 
living cities, though they undoubtedly remain poorer. 
 
5.3  Inequality Dynamics: Interior versus Coast 
  Regional differences play a relatively small role in the overall changes in inequality we observe. 
This does not preclude the possibility of differences in the dynamics of inequality between regions that 
may be important in their own right, and possibly linked to the growth process. Geography may matter in 
more complicated ways than generating differences in mean incomes. The focus on coastal versus inland 
economic outcomes may be justified, though for more subtle reasons. In Table 6, we provide summary 
data on incomes, inequality and the results of a spatial decomposition for the coastal and interior regions 
separately using the CHNS for the 1990s. Coastal here includes the provinces of Liaoning, Shandong, 
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mean incomes in the coastal provinces were only modestly higher than they were in the interior, with both 
urban and rural incomes in the coastal areas higher than their counterparts in the interior. Over the decade, 
the difference in average incomes between the two regions widened considerably, with mean income in 
the coastal provinces 2215 yuan by 2000 compared to 1652 in the interior, or a difference of a third. 
  Much of the increase in the gap, however, appears to be the result of a growing difference in 
incomes between rural households in the coastal and interior provinces. By 2000, rural incomes in the 
coastal provinces are nearly fifty percent higher than they are in the interior. On the other hand, there are 
only modest differences in the rate of growth of incomes of urban households in the two regions, and the 
ratio of mean or median urban incomes in the two regions remains more or less constant over this period. 
The failure of incomes in the interior to keep up with coastal areas appears to be a rural phenomenon.    
  Differences in the behavior of inequality in the two regions are equally telling. Not only is the 
level of inequality higher in the interior, but the increase through the 1990s is greater as well. In the 
coastal provinces, inequality increases from 0.35 to 0.39, with the increase occurring largely in the early 
1990s. In the interior, it increases from 0.39 to 0.48.  The significantly larger increase in the interior can 
be attributed to two key factors; first, the more rapid increase in inequality in rural areas in the interior 
compared to the coastal provinces; and second, a widening rural-urban income gap in the interior 
compared to the coastal areas. In the interior, rural inequality increases from 0.40 to 0.49, but in the 
coastal provinces inequality remains more or less the same (just under 0.40). In the interior, on the other 
hand, the rural-urban gap widens from 1.58 to 1.85, while in the coastal provinces it falls from 1.60 to 
1.32.  Partially offsetting some of this is the more rapid increase in urban inequality in the interior. 
  Several of these same trends are also mirrored in mean provincial urban and rural household 
incomes reported by the NBS, and provided in Table 7.   We attribute to everyone living in urban (rural) 
areas in a province the same mean per capita income, and use the urban-rural spatial deflators and 
population weights to construct a mean provincial income. We then use the NBS data and our constructed 
estimates to look at inequality in mean provincial urban and rural incomes within the two regions 
separately, the differences in urban-rural incomes, as well as inequality in mean provincial incomes in the 
two regions. This simulation exercise sets inequality to zero within the urban and rural sectors of each 
province. Significantly, the pooled Gini is both higher, and rises more rapidly in the interior than it does 
in the coastal provinces.  The primary source of the difference in the behavior between the two regions is 
the failure of rural incomes in the interior to grow as rapidly as the urban incomes.  While the NBS data 
may suffer from some of the re-classification bias we discussed earlier, we observed the same 
phenomenon in the CHNS (in Table 6). 
  How might we explain these differences in the behavior of the inequality between the two 
regions? There is a potential link with the paper in this volume by Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu (2005) on Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 24 
growth and structural transformation in China, and the influence of the size of the state sector on the 
absorption of labor out of the countryside. At the outset of the reforms, the role of the state sector was 
significantly more important in the interior than in the coastal provinces. Some of this reflected the policy 
of the Third Front, and a redirection of much of China’s industrial investment to the interior in the 1960s 
and 1970s. With reform, the growth of the non-state sector in the interior provinces has been much slower 
as more resources went to support a larger population tied to state sector in the urban state sector. This has 
handicapped the growth in rural incomes through the demand for labor in a host of secondary and tertiary 
industry in both the urban and rural sectors.
14  As we shall see, the most significant source of growth for 
rural households has been in non-agricultural activity, especially off-farm wages and family businesses. 
Although migration to coastal provinces has relaxed some of these constraints, it can be argued that 
expansion in these opportunities has been more seriously constrained as more resources have been tied up 
in the interior provinces in supporting an inefficient state sector. In contrast, growth in the non-state sector 
in the more dynamic coastal provinces has helped to keep the urban-rural income gap from rising, but has 
also provided a wide array of opportunities to households that has prevented a sharp deterioration in rural 
inequality as observed in the interior. 
  So geography does matter. However, the story of rising inequality in China is not dominated by 
divergence of incomes between rich and poor provinces. Economic opportunity clearly varies across 
regions, and this undoubtedly affects the development of rural areas. However, a considerable amount of 
inequality exists, and has been rising, within each of China’s regions, however we define them. 
 
6.0  The Composition of Income 
 
  If two households were selected at random from the same village (or city) in 1980, and then again 
in 2000, we have seen that the expected absolute difference in their incomes has unambiguously risen. 
Why? Addressing this question requires a careful analysis of the evolution of institutions that map 
household endowments into family income, and is a significant research enterprise in itself. Our more 
limited objective here is to sketch some of the correlates of the within-village or city inequality, 
particularly those related to the composition of household income. We also present some explorations of 
other potential correlates of widening income differences between households. 
  Studying the composition of income provides a direct estimate of the changing economic 
structure. For example, how important is non-farm self-employment to rising rural incomes, and to what 
extent is unequal access to such opportunities a driving force in rising inequality? In cities, has self-
                                                 
14 They find at the provincial level that the reallocation of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture is inversely 
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employment also grown, especially with SOE reform? We report the results of two exercises that 
summarize the changing composition of income. The first is a straightforward decomposition of mean 
incomes. Household i’s income,  yi , is the sum of its income from K various sources,  yik , (some of which 










A one-percent increase in mean income from source k will increase mean household income by: 
wk = yk y  
the average share of income source k in total income. Our first exercise thus reports the changing 
composition of the levels of income. 
The second exercise reports the decomposition of income inequality. What fraction of income 
inequality can be attributed to inequality of income source k? Our key tool for this analysis is the 
decomposition proposed by Shorrocks (1982, 1983).  The Shorrocks decomposition for a particular 
source of income k yields sk , defined by:  
Iy () = skI
k=1
K
∑ yk ()  
For any income source k,  sk  is the proportion of the Gini (or any other inequality index,  Iy ( )) 
“caused” by inequality in the distribution of yk . Obviously, increases in the inequality of any given 
income source will lead to an increase in overall income inequality. The Shorrocks decomposition,sk , 
differs from the share of the income source wk , because it accounts for the correlation between the 
income source, and total income. Certain income sources tend to be earned by the rich or poor. An 
increase in the inequality of income earned by the rich will increase inequality by even more than its share 
in total income, if the spread in income leads to more of that income going to the rich. Similarly, an 
increase in inequality of income earned by the poor could, in principle, reduce overall inequality if it 
increased the relative incomes of the poor. This would lead to a negative sk , which almost never happens. 
For our purposes, we view wk  as a reasonable benchmark forsk .  When  sk > wk, then inequality of 
income source k contributes more to inequality than it does to mean income, which we denote as a 
disproportionate effect on inequality. In other words, if income from family businesses comprises 10 Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 26 
percent of average income, but inequality of family business income contributes 20 percent of inequality, 
we will conclude that family business income has a disproportionate effect on inequality. 
 
6.1 Urban  Incomes 
  Table 8 provides a summary of the structure of urban incomes, as well as the Shorrocks 
decomposition, using the NBS data. We show results from the beginning and end of our sample to 
illustrate trends in the composition of income. In 1987, wages comprised 86 percent of income, and were 
by far the most important component of urban incomes. However, as recorded by the NBS, wages do not 
appear to include many of the subsidies that urban residents received, including access to goods and 
services at below market prices, as well as the value of the in-kind component of incomes. These were 
especially important in the 1980s, and then declined sharply in the early 1990s. The NBS numbers thus 
probably understate the importance of having a wage job.  In 1987, the Shorrocks decomposition shows 
that while comprising 86 percent of total income, inequality of wage income only explained 66 percent of 
total income inequality. While higher wage inequality obviously increases overall inequality, the increase 
is lower than its share of total income. In 1987, wages were thus relatively equalizing (compared to other 
sources of income). By comparison, when we move to 2001 we observe a small decline of about ten 
percent in the percentage of households with wage income, and an even larger decline in the percentage 
of income coming from wages, to 68 percent. This is partially offset by modest increases in the share of 
income from self-employment (still very small in the NBS data), and pensions. By 2001, more than a 
third of all urban households report pension income, with pensions the source of nearly twenty percent of 
all income. The notable change in the Shorrocks decomposition is that while wage earnings are now a 
smaller share of total income than in 1987, they now account for an even larger share of income 
inequality. Understanding urban inequality, and the rise in urban inequality, thus demands an 
understanding of changes in the labor market, and the determination of individual earnings. 
Given the potentially important role of food subsidies, and also the possible under-estimation of 
family business income in the NBS data, we repeat the exercise using the CHNS data. The income 
categories will not be identical, but broad and rough comparisons are still helpful. The CHNS data   
provide a much better picture than do the NBS data of the role of subsidies, including access to major 
consumer goods (primarily food) and housing at below market prices, childcare, etc.  These subsidies 
typically were allocated in a fairly egalitarian way to urban residents, often through employers, and in 
1991, represented a full quarter of a household’s average income. Between 1991 and 2000, they declined 
in absolute terms by more than half, and by a factor of four when measured as a proportion of income.
15  
                                                 
15 The decline in these subsidies was precipitated by fiscal problems of the central government. By the early 1990s, 
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The Shorrocks decompositions also confirm that these subsidies contributed very little to overall 
inequality, and were relatively equalizing. The decline in these subsidies almost certainly helped 
contribute to growing inequality. The CHNS data show a smaller share of urban income coming from 
wages, though some of this may reflect the aggregation of subsidies into the NBS wage income. That 
said, wage income is still the most important source of income, and the largest contributor to urban 
income inequality. One further striking feature of the CHNS, in contrast to the NBS data, is the 
importance of income from family businesses. The estimated share of income from self-employment is 
higher in the CHNS (10 percent versus 5 percent), while in 2000 it contributes to over one third of overall 
inequality. This helps account for the higher level of urban inequality in the CHNS, and underscores the 
limitations of NBS survey data in collecting income on family enterprises. 
  But earnings inequality is still the main story in cities. It is important, however, to note that there 
are several potentially important dimensions to wage earnings. As explained in detail in Cai, Park, and 
Zhao (2005), urban labor markets underwent considerable change, even over the most recent 15 years of 
reform (since 1990).  Enterprise reform, especially in SOE’s, may have contributed to widening 
differentials in wage rates across firms and individuals.  Workers lucky enough to work in successful 
enterprises would see their wages grow faster than those in poor performing firms.
16 Private sector firms 
would be more likely to pay on the basis of individual productivity, generating further inequality of 
wages. With the increase in the layoffs from the state sector beginning in the mid-1990s, and with over 40 
million now laid off in industry, we might expect some of the growing dispersion in incomes to be 
coming from a shift into the lower paying self-employment or perhaps early retirement for some 
individuals and households. In short, some of the rising inequality of wage earnings may have arisen as 
some people’s wage earnings fell to zero (Meng, 2004). Even among those households with working 
members in the wage sector, an increase in wage earnings inequality could be coming from either 
growing differences in time worked (days, months, or weeks), or wage rates per unit of time. 
  In Table 9 and Figure 5 we use the CHNS urban data to look at this dimension of urban inequality 
more carefully, and evaluate the relative contribution of “wages” versus “hours” to overall earnings 
inequality.  The top half of Table 9 provides measures of the inequality of wage earnings, first over all 
households, and then over only those reporting positive wage earnings. For all urban households, the Gini 
coefficient for earnings rose from 0.49 to 0.67, an increase of almost 50 percent. Some of this increase 
was driven by the growing number of households without any wage earnings. In the second panel, we see 
that the proportion of households with positive wage earnings fell from 75 percent in 1991 to 58 percent 
                                                 
16 Yuen (2000) confirms that the tighter connection between SOE performance and worker wages led to greater 
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in 2000. This significant drop probably reflects the layoffs associated with SOE restructuring, and may be 
a transitory outcome, as opposed to a long run trend. 
Figure 5 expands on these proportions, plotting the wage-employment rates by age category, for 
men and women separately.  To what extent is the decline in wage employment (and thus wage income) 
concentrated among certain cohorts, especially the elderly? We observe significant reductions in wage 
employment for all age groups beginning in the mid-1990s, that are especially severe at the tails of the 
age distribution (20-30, 50+) for men, and for prime-age women (20-40) that are likely related to labor 
market and SOE reform. It turns out that these declines are paralleled by similar reductions in labor force 
participation rates (in all types of work), so that the percentage of individuals that work in wage 
employment (among those working) actually remains fairly constant over time. What is most striking, 
nonetheless, from Figure 5, is the huge drop in access to wage jobs for the youngest cohorts. While the 
elderly clearly have plenty to be concerned about, it is poor job prospects for twenty to thirty years olds 
that may have the longest run adverse impact on welfare. 
Returning to Table 9, continuing in the second panel, we see that earnings inequality still rose 
among those with positive earnings, with the Gini rising from 0.32 to 0.42. How much of this rise is due 
to quantity worked, as opposed to the returns? In the bottom part of Table 9, we provide a simple 
decomposition of the log of wage earnings for those households with positive wage earnings into 
constituent log months worked and log monthly wages, as well as the covariance between the two. We 
express the results in levels, as well as the percentage of the total variation explained.
17  Over the entire 
period, the variance of the log of wage earnings for those households with wage earnings increased by 
more than fifty percent.  In 1991, 53.1 percent of the variance can be attributed to the variance in the log 
of months worked, with the variance in the monthly wage explaining 39.2 percent.  Over the ten-year 
period between 1991 and 2000, there is not much of a change in the dispersion of months worked, 
however there is a more than doubling in the variance of the log monthly wage. Indeed, most of the 
increase that we observe in the dispersion of average annual wage earnings can be attributed to an 
increase in the dispersion of average monthly “wages.” As important as access to jobs may be in 
generating rising inequality, rising wage inequality among those working the same number of months is 
also an important element of the story. 
  As documented in Cai, Park, and Zhao (2005), one the likely source of the increase in wage 
inequality is the increase in the rate of return to human capital. Park, Song, Zhang, and Zhao (2003) also 
show that no matter how you partition workers into groups (e.g., high and low educated, old or young), 
wage dispersion has also increased dramatically. This residual inequality – while poorly understood – is 
labeled inequality due to “unobserved skill.” It is not surprising that that the returns to unobserved 
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productivity should rise through the reforms. From a policy perspective, however, the returns to schooling 
are more interesting. Over the 1990s, the average rate of return to an additional year of education 
increased from 4 percent to more than 10 percent. The increase in return was also not realized uniformly 
over years of educational attainment; in other words, the percentage increase in wage earnings resulting 
from an additional year of school was not the same for some one with a middle school degree (9 years) 
and a high school degree (12 years). In fact, it appears that a significant amount of the increase was 
realized by those with university degrees, as wage earnings of those with a university degree increased 
significantly relative to someone with only high school degree. 
  If the distribution of education (or human capital) was immutable, then rising returns to schooling 
might lead to ever widening income gaps. As documented by Behrman, Hannum, Wang (2005), however, 
educational attainment is rising quickly in China. In Figure 6 we use the CHNS to plot the age-education 
profiles for men and women in urban (and rural) China. Two important patterns are confirmed. First, is 
the clear increase in educational attainment for both men and women, across the age distribution. It isn’t 
only the young benefiting from increased investments in schooling. Subsequent cohorts of prime and 
middle-aged individuals are also showing the fruits of investments in education made prior to reforms. 
Second, while men’s schooling attainment remains higher than women, especially for older cohorts, the 
improvement in schooling levels has been greatest for women. From the perspective of predicting trends 
in future inequality, a key determinant will be whether the increasing supply of educated workers is 
enough to off-set the increasing demand for educated workers. If it is not, we can expect to see further 
rising returns to schooling, and widening income inequality. If supply increases fast enough, we might 
instead see an attenuation of the growth in wage inequality, as is believed to have happened in other 
Asian economies (Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot, 1995). 
  In our final exploration of urban income inequality, we examine the role of age – or cohort – in 
rising inequality. To what extent is there an age dimension to urban poverty? For example, are the elderly 
being left behind?  In Figure 7 we plot log household per capita income by age group by year, using the 
CHNS. The plotted lines mirror the means shown in Table 2, with significant growth in average incomes 
between 1991 and 2001. Until age 60, incomes seem to rise with age. Clearly, however, the incomes of 
those 60 and older are lower than those younger, and the gap has been persistent over time. That said, the 
per capita incomes of the elderly have been improving like everyone else’s, so while they may not be as 
rich as those who are presumably still working, the elderly in China’s cities appear to be sharing in the 
general improvements of living standards. 
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6.2 Rural  Incomes 
  If labor markets lie at the heart of rising urban inequality, what are the most important factors 
behind the slower changing, but higher level of inequality in rural areas? Previous studies have 
emphasized the role of non-farm income in contributing to rising rural inequality, especially departing 
from the relatively equal world of farm incomes derived from an egalitarian land distribution.
18   The 
bottom panel of Table 8 provides data for the composition of rural incomes for 1987 and 2001 using the 
RCRE data. For 1987, income from farming, including both cropping and agricultural sideline activity 
(animal husbandry, forestry and fishery) was the source of more than half of all income, with participation 
in farming and farm sidelines nearly universal among households. This reflects the fact that nearly all 
households in rural China were allocated land. By itself, income from grain was thirty percent of total 
household income.  Family business, mostly in commerce and services, comprised 16 percent of income, 
while wage income was the second largest overall component, at 25 percent. Most wage income in the 
1980s was earned locally, within the village or township, with more than two-thirds of all households 
reporting income from wages. 
  This structure of income changed dramatically by the end of the period, with much of this 
occurring in the late 1990s.  Especially noteworthy is the sharp drop in the percentage of income coming 
from agriculture, mostly crop income. A significant portion of the decline can be linked to the sharp drop 
in farm prices beginning in the mid-1990s.  Currently, agriculture and agriculture sidelines combine for 
only thirty-one percent of total household income. We also see an increase in the relative importance of 
income from family businesses, which rose from 16 to 20 percent as a share of total income. But the 
largest improvements in family income came from wage earnings, especially wages earned by temporary 
migrants.
19   Locally earned wages have become less important in both relative and absolute terms, while 
employment opportunities outside the village and accessed through migration have become a more 
important source of labor earnings. 
  Turning to the Shorrocks decompositions for 1987, we find that agricultural income, while dis-
equalizing, contributed much less to overall inequality than its share of total income (13 percent versus 
approximately 40 percent).
20  The same applied to agricultural sidelines, so that combining all agriculture-
related sources, only 20 percent of total inequality was attributed to inequality of agricultural income, 
                                                 
18 See Benjamin, Brandt, Glewwe and Guo (2002) for a survey of these studies, e.g., Hare (1994). 
19 The wage earnings of temporary migrants include household members resident in the village, but who commute 
outside the village to work and return on weekends, as well as wage earnings brought home by locally registered 
household members who work outside the village for a substantial portion of the year. The RCRE survey does not 
permit a further disaggregation. 
20 Elsewhere (Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles, 2005) we have carried out the same decompositions controlling for 
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even while this source accounted for 53 percent of total income. For 2001, agricultural income excluding 
sidelines was almost irrelevant to inequality: while it still comprised 21 percent of income, it accounted 
for only 6 percent of overall inequality. It was very hard to get rich farming. This reflected the low crop 
prices already mentioned, as well as constraints on farm size implicit in the administrative allocation of 
land. 
  We explore the land distribution more specifically in Table 10. Here we report the Gini 
coefficient, as well as the 90/10 ratio for per capita managed land. Land inequality did grow from 1987 to 
2002, but it is still quite low by developing country standards. The Gini in 2002 was 0.48. Note that 
unlike incomes, however, much of this inequality reflects differences in farm size across space: 70 
percent of the variation in farm size is explained by village dummies, and over 30 percent by province. 
Even across space, land area is a poor measure of the land endowment, given the usual negative 
correlation between land quality and farm size. For example, in some areas land can be multiple-cropped 
(farmed more than once a year). Farm sizes also tend to be smaller in these areas, so “farm size” 
understates a household’s “land capacity.” The spatial decomposition based on cultivated area alone will 
thus exaggerate differences in land across space. Still, there is only limited (but non-zero!) effective land 
inequality within villages. That largely explains why farm income contributes so little to overall 
inequality: farm income is quite equally distributed. It is worth noting, however, that equality of farm 
income, even as a consequence of the egalitarian land policy does not imply that the land distribution 
policy is necessarily good for overall income inequality. More inequality of farm income might actually 
reduce overall income inequality. While not quite negative, the Shorrocks decomposition is close to zero. 
Especially if low income households have poor non-farm alternatives, it would be to their advantage to 
specialize in farming, thus leading to more inequality of farm income (and less total inequality). And 
unequal access to non-farm opportunities matters more than ever. 
In 2001, agricultural sidelines (like raising livestock) explain 18 percent of inequality, higher than 
the 10 percent of income they represent. Wage income, however, was the single largest contributor to 
overall inequality, with 44 of overall inequality explained by inequality of wage earnings. This is only 
slightly larger than the now substantial share of total income comprised by wages: 42 percent. Within the 
wage category, local wages were relatively dis-equalizing, while wages from employment outside the 
village were relatively equalizing. Non-farm family businesses contributed most to inequality compared 
to their share of income (29 percent compared to about 20 percent). 
  Taken together, these decompositions highlight two important sources of inequality, especially 
when we compare 2001 to 1987. First is the sharp decline of the relatively equalizing source of income 
from farming. Second is the relative increase in dis-equalizing income from non-farm family businesses, 
and the failure of non-farm labor markets to provide enough income opportunities for low-income Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 32 
households to offset the collapse of agricultural income. Past emphasis on the role of non-farm income as 
a source of inequality was only partially correct. Increasing agricultural incomes – at least in an 
equalizing way – are unlikely to improve overall income distribution, if for no other reason than 
agricultural incomes are only weakly associated with overall income, and they are also very low. 
  These results also underscore the important potential role of education in affecting the future 
trajectory of inequality. Success in family businesses, and in local and migration-based labor markets may 
be facilitated by higher levels of education. In the short run, as in urban areas, there may “excess returns” 
for those with more education, helping generate more inequality. In fact, as discussed by Benjamin, 
Brandt, Glewwe and Guo (2002), excess returns to education may be worsened even further in more 
remote areas with poorly developed markets. This is also potentially reflected in our previous contrast 
between the more remote inland versus coastal regions. Inequality of education, poorly developed off-
farm opportunities,  and low returns to farming do not bode well for the future. What is happening to the 
distribution of schooling? 
  Returning to Figure 6, we array the average years of schooling by age, sex, and year for rural 
areas (using the CHNS). As we saw for city-dwellers, there have been steady improvements in the level 
of education, reflected in all age categories. Most remarkable here are the relatively large gains made by 
women, significantly closing the gap with men, especially for the younger cohorts. The level of education 
is still lower, however, than in cities. To the extent that rural areas need economic development as much 
as the cities, it will be important that the urban-rural gap in schooling narrow over time. 
  Finally, in Figure 7 we explore the age-dimension of the income distribution. The general shape 
of the age-income profiles is similar in the rural sample to what we described for the urban sample: per 
capita income rises with age until age 60, then falls. Furthermore, the profiles have been moving upwards 
over time, reflecting general improvements in living standards. The most striking difference between the 
rural and urban pictures concerns the relative position of the elderly. In the countryside, the economic 
improvements experienced by the elderly (those over 60) are much smaller than for other age groups. The 
rural elderly are falling behind. 
 
7.0  Interim Conclusions and Apparent Themes 
 
  Over the course of two and half decades of reform, China experienced a significant increase in 
inequality that is likely underestimated by the data we use. These increases are observed within both the 
urban and rural populations. In rural areas, this increase is tied to the dis-equalizing role of some forms of 
non-agricultural income, and laggard growth of farming income, especially beginning in the mid-1990s. 
In urban areas, on the other hand, a decline in the role of subsidies and entitlements, increasing wage 
inequality related to labor market and enterprise reform, and the effect of restructuring of SOE’s on some Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 33 
cohorts and households through layoffs have all played a part in widening the income distribution. 
Corruption may have also played in role in distribution of wealth and welfare, but this is much more 
difficult to measure.  Regional (spatial differences), although certainly present, are much less important 
than commonly believed for both urban and rural populations, as well as urban and rural combined.  The 
same is true for differences between China’s urban and rural areas. 
  This increase in inequality however must be seen in the context of rapidly rising incomes and 
improvements in welfare that literally pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty, especially in 
agriculture. Prior to the onset of reforms poverty in urban areas was very low, largely because of the 
severe urban bias in Chinese policy, and the fairly egalitarian distribution of incomes in the cities.   
Poverty does persist however—probably on the order of ten percent of the Chinese population or in 
excess of 120 million—and is largely a rural phenomenon. There is a need for more research in estimating 
and identifying the poor in both urban and rural areas. Probably the most obvious and feasible policy 
recommendation is to facilitate this research by improving access to nationally representative household 
survey data, as well as the implementation of household surveys designed to better measure income.  
But there are obvious other areas of public policy that need to take account of rising inequality. 
First, a recurring theme in our research, as well as other chapters in this volume, is the important role 
played by education in both urban and rural areas. Probably no other single factor will be most closely 
tied to how the fruits of future growth are shared. Second, China will have to adopt and implement more 
features of a “social safety net,” as even universal education will not be enough to generate a “poverty-
free” income distribution. In the countryside, equally distributed land is unlikely to do the job, especially 
if returns to agriculture remain low. And finally, like most other countries, China will need to adopt a re-
distributive taxation system, both to support the social safety net, finance public goods, and allow the 
broader society to share in the obvious wealth being generated by the top part of the income distribution. 
Even with a richer understanding of the characteristics of the income distribution, the design and 
implementation of these and related types of policies will also provide a rich future research agenda. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 34 
8.0 References 
 
Behrman, Jere, Emily Hannum, and Meiyan Wang. 2005. "Human Capital in China," in China's 
Economic Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences. 
Benjamin, Dwayne and Loren Brandt. 1999. "Markets and Inequality in Rural China: Parallels with the 
Past." American Economic Review, 89:2, pp. 292-95. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles. 2005. "The Evolution of Income Inequality in Rural 
China." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53:4, pp. 769-824. 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, Paul Glewwe, and Li Guo. 2002. "Markets, Human Capital, and 
Inequality: Evidence from China," in Inequality Around the World. Richard Freeman ed. London: 
Palgrave, pp. 87-127. 
Brandt, Loren, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Xiaodong Zhu. 2005. "Structural Transformation and Growth in 
China: 1978-2000," in China's Economic Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences. 
Brandt, Loren; and Carsten Holz. 2004. "Spatial Price Differences in China." Manuscript, University of 
Toronto. 
Cai, Fang, Albert Park, and Yaohui Zhao. 2005. "The Chinese Labor Market," in China's Economic 
Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences. 
Deaton, Angus. 1997. The analysis of household surveys: A microeconometric approach to development 
policy. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 
Gustafsson, Bjorn and Li Shi. 2002. "Income inequality within and across counties in rural China 1988 
and 1995." Journal of Development Economics, 69, pp. 179-204. 
Hare, Denise. 1994. "Rural Nonagricultural Activities and their impact on the distribution of income: 
Evidence frlom farm households in southern China." China Economic Review, 5:1, pp. 59-82. 
Kanbur, Ravi and Xiaobo Zhang. 1999. "Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural-Urban and 
Inland-Coastal Inequality in China, 1988 to 1995." Journal of Comparative Economics, 27:4, pp. 
686-701. 
Khan, Azizur Rahman and Carl Riskin. 1998. "Income and Inequality in China: Composition, 
Distribution and Growth of Household Income, 1988 to 1995." China Quarterly, 0:154, pp. 221-
53. 
Khan, Azizur Rahman and Carl Riskin. 1999. "Income Distribution in Urban China during the Period of 
Economic Reform and Globalization." American Economic Review, 89:2, pp. 296-300. 
Lardy, Nicholas. 1984. "Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978-83." China Quarterly, 100, 
pp. 849-65. Income Inequality During China’s Economic Transition, Page 35 
Meng, Xin. 2004. "Economic Restructuring and Income Inequality in Urban China." Review of Income 
and Wealth, 50:3, pp. 357-79. 
Meng, Xin, Robert Gregory, and Youjuan Wang. 2004. "Poverty, inequality, and growth in urban China, 
1986-2000." Manuscript, Australia National University. 
Park, Albert, Xiaoqing Song, Junsen Zhang, and Yaohui Zhao. 2003. "The Growth of Wage Inequality in 
Urban China, 1988 to 1999." Unpublished Manuscript. 
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen. 2004. "China's (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty." Manuscript, 
World Bank. 
Rawski, Thomas. 1982. "The Simple Arithmetic of Chinese Income Distribution." Keizai Kenkyu, 33:1, 
pp. 12-26. 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. 1982. "Decomposition by Factor Components." Econometrica, 50:1, pp. 193-211. 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. 1983. "The Impact of Income Components on the Distribution of Family 
Incomes." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98:2, pp. 311-26. 
Vermeer, E.B. 1982. "Income Differentials in Rural China." China Quarterly, 89, pp. 1-33. 
Yuen, Terence. 2000. Employment and Wage Dynamics: Estimating the Impact of Labour Market 
Institutions: Unpublished Dissertation, University of Toronto. 
 
 
 Table 1 
The Distribution of Household Per Capita Income 
Selected Years 
Urban and Rural Separately 
  1987 1991 1995 2001 
Urban (NBS) 
Mean  Income  1533 1742 2385 3411 
Gini  0.22 0.25 0.30 0.34 
Gini (Spatially deflated)  0.20 0.22 0.28 0.33 
Theil  0.08 0.10 0.16 0.20 
Atkinson  (0.5)  0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 
Atkinson  (1)  0.08 0.10 0.14 0.18 
Atkinson  (2)  0.15 0.18 0.25 0.31 
90/10  2.64 2.97 3.90 4.77 
Below 0.5× 1987 Median  0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Consumption-based  measures:      
Mean  per  capita  consumption  1346 1491 1994 2702 
Gini  0.24 0.27 0.32 0.35 
Rural (RCRE) 
Mean Income  920  877  1225  1244 
Gini  0.32 0.33 0.33 0.37 
Gini (Spatially deflated)  0.29 0.30 0.30 0.34 
Theil  0.19 0.22 0.21 0.27 
Atkinson  (0.5)  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12 
Atkinson  (1)  0.16 0.17 0.17 0.21 
Atkinson  (2)  0.28 0.32 0.33 0.43 
90/10  4.06 3.98 3.93 4.99 
Below 0.5× 1987 Median  0.16 0.19 0.07 0.11 
Consumption-based  measures:      
Mean  per  capita  consumption  652 635 864 826 
Gini  0.25 0.27 0.27 0.33 
 
Notes: (1) All calculations are based on real per capita income, expressed in constant 1990 yuan; (2) The “Spatially Deflated” 
Gini calculation is based on further adjustments for geographic differences in cost-of-living as described in Brandt and Holz 
(2004); (3) “90/10” is the ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th percentiles of the income distribution;  (4) “Below 0.5× 1987 Median” is 
the proportion of individuals with per capita incomes below a constant benchmark, namely one-half the median 1987 per 
capita income. 
 
 Table 2 
The Distribution of Household Per Capita Income 
Selected Years, CHNS 
Urban and Rural Separately 
  1991 1993 1997 2000 
Urban 
Mean  Income  1484 1651 1982 2532 
Gini  0.29 0.35 0.35 0.38 
Theil      
Atkinson  (0.5)  0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 
Atkinson  (1)  0.15 0.22 0.23 0.27 
Atkinson  (2)  0.40 0.50 0.59 0.62 
90/10  4.40 6.50 6.32 8.24 
Below 0.5× 1987 Median      
Rural 
Mean Income  917  984  1344  1623 
Gini  0.39 0.43 0.41 0.46 
Theil  0.26 0.32 0.28 0.36 
Atkinson  (0.5)  0.13 0.15 0.14 0.18 
Atkinson  (1)  0.25 0.31 0.28 0.36 
Atkinson  (2)  0.31 0.68 0.66 0.77 
90/10  7.25 8.78 8.76  11.65 
Below 0.5× 1987 Median  0.21 0.22 0.13 0.13 
 
Notes: (1) All calculations are based on real per capita income, expressed in constant 1990 yuan;  (2) “90/10” is the ratio of the 
90
th to the 10
th percentiles of the income distribution;  (4) “ Below 0.5× 1987 Median” is the proportion of individuals with per 
capita incomes below a constant benchmark, namely one-half the median 1987 per capita income. 
 
 Table 3 
Spatial Variation of Incomes, Selected years 
Urban and Rural Separately 
Various Data Sets 
  1987 1991 1995 2001 
Urban  (NBS)      
Province  0.26 0.30 0.37 0.28 
City     0.48  0.39 
Province  (Spatially  deflated)  0.17 0.17 0.29 0.13 
City (Spatially deflated)     0.34 0.27 
      
Rural  (RCRE)      
Province  0.24 0.22 0.18 0.19 
Village  0.50 0.47 0.41 0.43 
Province  (Spatially  deflated)  0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 
Village  (Spatially  deflated)  0.43 0.39 0.35 0.33 
  CHNS-Based 
  1991 1993 1997 2000 
Urban  (CHNS)      
Province  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 
City  0.29 0.29 0.25 0.13 
Rural  (CHNS)      
Province  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Village  0.24 0.30 0.22 0.21 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports the proportion of total variation of log per capita income explained by a set of location 
indicators. This is calculated as the R-squared from a regression of “ln y” on a set of dummy variables for province, 
city, or cluster, depending on the level of spatial analysis. (2) The “spatially deflated” series refer to incomes 
adjusted for provincial differences in the cost of living, as calculated by Brandt and Holz (2004). 
 
 Table 4 
Inequality for Combined Urban and Rural Samples 
CHNS Data 
  1991 1993 1997 2000 
Pooled Distributional Characteristics      
Mean Per Capita Income  1121  1194  1560  1912 
Gini  Coefficient  0.37 0.42 0.40 0.44 
Atkinson  (0.5)  0.12 0.15 0.13 0.17 
Atkinson  (1)  0.24 0.30 0.27 0.34 
Atkinson  (2)  0.51 0.67 0.66 0.76 
90/10  Ratio  6.93 8.82 8.49  11.04 
       
Spatial  Decompositions       
Province  Only  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Province plus Urban-Rural (interactions) 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.14 
City or Village (Cluster)  0.31  0.36  0.28  0.17 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports mean incomes and inequality measures for a combined sample of urban and rural households, 
where adjustment has been made for spatial differences in the cost of living, including urban-rural differences in prices (from 
Brandt and Holz, 2004); (2) All figures are reported based on the spatially deflated, constant 1990 yuan; (3) The spatial 
decompositions are the same as described in Tables 8 and 9. (4) “Province plus Urban-Rural” means province interacted with 
a rural/urban indicator (which does not permit spatial differences within the urban or rural sectors within a province). 
 
 Table 5 
The Sensitivity of Urban-Rural Distinctions to the Definition of "Rural" 
Mean Per Capita Incomes and Growth, CHNS 
 
  1991 1993 1997 2000  Growth 
Fixed Definition of Rural       
Rural Mean Income  917  984  1343  1623  0.063 
Urban  Mean  Income  1484 1651 1982 2532 0.059 
Urban/Rural Ratio  1.62 1.68 1.48 1.56   
Evolving Definition of Rural       
Rural Mean Income  772  766  1042  1108  0.040 
Urban  Mean  Income  1391 1474 1798 2106 0.046 
Urban/Rural Ratio  1.80 1.92 1.73 1.90   
 
Notes: (1) This table shows mean per capita incomes expressed in constant 1990 yuan, for two types of rural 
definition. (2) The first definition of urban-rural is based on the CHNS sampling definition, where “rural” 
includes “purely” rural and “suburban” households, approximately corresponding to rural registered 
households. This definition is fixed for the entire period, so that a 1991 rural household (cluster) remains rural 
in 2000. (3) The second definition is based on economic structure, and evolves with economic development. 
Clusters are defined as rural if fifty percent or more of households earn fifty percent or more of their income 
from farming (i.e., most of the households are farmers). This definition is re-calculated each survey, so clusters 
can evolve from rural to urban classification. (4) “Growth” is defined as the implied annual compounded rate 
from 1991 through 2000. 
 
 Table 6 
Combined Urban and Rural Inequality 
Exploring the Interaction with Geography (Inland versus Coastal Provinces) 
(CHNS) 
 
  1991 1993 1997 2000 
 Distributional  Characteristics 
Coastal regions      
Mean Per Capita Income  (Combined)  1167 1316 1746 2215 
Mean,  Urban  Separately  1580 1792 2153 2725 
Mean, Rural Separately  991  1150  1620  2065 
      
Gini Coefficient (Combined)  0.35 0.39 0.37 0.39 
Gini, Urban Separately  0.26 0.34 0.35 0.37 
Gini, Rural Separately  0.38 0.40 0.38 0.39 
      
Interior regions       
Mean Per Capita Income  (Combined)  1078 1086 1433 1652 
Mean,  Urban  Separately  1352 1473 1862 2338 
Mean, Rural Separately  858  850  1152  1265 
      
Gini Coefficient (Combined)  0.39 0.45 0.41 0.48 
Gini, Urban Separately  0.31 0.37 0.35 0.39 
Gini, Rural Separately  0.40 0.45 0.42 0.49 
 Spatial  Decompositions 
Coastal regions      
Province  0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Province  plus  Urban-Rural  0.14 0.10 0.06 0.06 
City/Village  0.46 0.43 0.29 0.24 
Interior regions      
Province  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Province  plus  Urban-Rural  0.15 0.13 0.10 0.13 
City/Village    0.35 0.33 0.26 0.30 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports mean incomes and inequality measures for a combined sample of urban and rural households, 
where adjustment has been made for spatial differences in the cost of living, including urban-rural differences in prices (from 
Brandt and Holz, 2004); (2) All figures are reported based on the spatially deflated, constant 1990 yuan; (3) The spatial 
decompositions are the same as described in Tables 8 and 9. “Province plus Urban-Rural” means province interacted with a 
rural/urban indicator (which does not permit spatial differences within the urban or rural sectors within a province) 
 
 Table 7 
Spatial Income Differences Across Regions 
 
  Mean Income  Gini Coefficients 
Year  Rural Urban Ratio  Rural Urban  Combined 
Inland Provinces        
1985  744  1225  1.65  0.092 0.087 0.147 
1988  743  1357  1.82  0.092 0.083 0.169 
1991  741  1519  2.05  0.081 0.090 0.197 
1994  833  1911  2.29  0.107 0.103 0.235 
1997  1102 2122 1.92 0.087  0.111  0.202 
2000  1222 2672 2.19 0.085  0.109  0.234 
        
Coastal Provinces        
1985  857  1295  1.51  0.065 0.087 0.128 
1988  953  1499  1.57  0.059 0.110 0.151 
1991  993  1717  1.73  0.054 0.099 0.164 
1994  1206 2268 1.88 0.095  0.114  0.196 
1997  1647 2566 1.56 0.082  0.100  0.153 
2000  1852 3140 1.70 0.087  0.102  0.175 
 
Notes: (1) This table shows the “simulated” Pooled Gini coefficient for inland and coastal China, in which each 
individual in a province is attributed the mean per capita income for that province. This effectively sets within-
province inequality to zero for urban and rural China respectively. (2) The urban and rural Gini’s are based on 
spatially deflated per capita incomes, accounting for cross-province price differences, while the pooled Gini also 
spatially deflates with account for different prices in urban and rural areas. (3) For reference, we also show the ratio 
of urban to rural spatially deflated mean incomes. (4) Source: Authors’ calculations using NBS Yearbooks. 
 
 Table 8 
Composition of Income and Inequality Decompositions by Source 
Sample “End-points”  
Urban and Rural Separately 
  Urban (NBS) 
  1987 2001 
  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks 
Wage Income  0.98  0.86 0.66 0.87 0.68 0.72 
Family Business  0.02  0.01 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.01 
Pensions 0.20  0.07  0.12 0.33 0.15 0.11 
Family Transfers  0.34  0.02 0.10 0.35 0.02 0.03 
Other  0.96 0.03 0.09 0.67 0.07 0.13 
  Urban (CHNS) 
  1991 2000 
  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks 
Wage Income  0.77  0.46 0.32 0.64 0.52 0.46 
Family Business  0.15  0.07 0.35 0.17 0.10 0.37 
Subsidies  0.95 0.28 0.19 0.59 0.07 0.02 
Farming 0.18  0.07  0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Other  0.55 0.13 0.15 0.65 0.28 0.15 
     (of which is Pensions)  0.30  0.09    0.35  0.17   
  Rural (RCRE) 
  1987 2001 
  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks  p > 0  Share  Shorrocks 
Wage Income  0.71  0.25 0.37 0.71 0.42 0.44 
Family Business  0.62  0.16 0.34 0.47 0.20 0.29 
Agricultural  Income  0.98 0.40 0.13 0.92 0.21 0.06 
Agricultural  Sidelines  0.96 0.13 0.07 0.73 0.10 0.18 
Family Transfers  0.52  0.05 0.08 0.46 0.05 0.03 
Government Transfers  0.65 0.01 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.00 
Other  0.14 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports the composition of income, and the associated Shorrocks decompositions for urban and 
rural per capita household income; (2) “p >0” is the proportion of households (individuals) reporting positive (non-
zero) income from the given source; (3) The “Share” is the proportion (share) of total income earned in the specified 
category;  (4) The Shorrocks decompositions report the proportion of total inequality that can be attributed to 
inequality of that particular income source. 
 
 Table 9 
The Distribution of Wage Earnings 
Urban, CHNS 
  1991 1993 1997 2000 
 All  Households 
Gini  0.49 0.56 0.57 0.67 
Theil  E  0.46 0.61 0.64 0.91 
Coefficient of Variation  0.94 1.25 1.26 1.72 
   
Households with Positive Earnings 
Proportion of All Households  0.75  0.72  0.66  0.58 
Gini  0.32 0.39 0.36 0.42 
Theil  E  0.17 0.28 0.23 0.36 
Coefficient of Variation  0.65 0.92 0.81 1.13 
 
Decomposition of Variance of Log Earnings: Hours versus “Wages” 
(Among those with positive Earnings) 
  Var % Var % Var % Var % 
Var (log wage earnings)  0.416 100 0.569 100 0.457 100 0.663 100 
Var (log months worked)  0.221  53.1  0.253  44.5 0.18 39.4  0.233  35.1 
Var (log monthly wage)  0.163  39.2 0.297 52.2 0.261 57.1 0.365 55.1 
Covariance (hours, wages)  0.032 7.7 0.016 2.8 0.016 3.5 0.065 9.8 
 
Notes: (1) This table uses the CHNS data to describe inequality of wage income in urban areas; (2) All nominal figures are 
expressed in constant 1990 yuan; (3) The top two panels report various measures of wage-income (earnings) inequality, 
including or excluding households with “zeroes” (unconditional, or conditional, on positive earnings); (4) The bottom panel 
reports the total variance of log earnings, decomposed into constituent log months worked and log average monthly wages, as 
well as the covariance between log months worked and log monthly wages (“Covariance (hours, wages)”). (5) The 
decomposition is expressed in levels, as well as the percentage of total variation explained “%”) 
 
 Table 10 
The Distribution of Farm Land 
Land Inequality and Spatial Variation 
Rural, RCRE 
  1987 1991 1995 2002 
Land Inequality      
Gini  0.37 0.37 0.39 0.48 
90/10  Ratio 5.43 5.94 7.50  25.60 
Spatial Variation      
Province  0.34 0.35 0.32 0.31 
Village  0.73 0.71 0.62 0.70 
 
Notes: (1) Land is defined as total per capita land managed by the household.  This includes village-allocated land, plus land 
contracted in, less land contracted out; (2) Spatial variation is the proportion of total variation of log per capita land explained by 
a set of location indicators. This is calculated as the R-squared from a regression of “ln per capita land” on a set of dummy 
variables for province or village, depending on the level of spatial analysis. 
 
 Figure 1: The Evolution of Mean Per-Capita Household Income, Selected Years 
 













Implied Annual Growth Rate (NBS): 5.7% 
Implied Annual Growth Rate (CHNS): 5.9% 
 












Implied Annual Growth Rate (RCRE): 2.0% 
Implied Annual Growth Rate (CHNS): 6.3% 
 
Notes: (1) All calculations based on real per capita income, expressed in constant 1990 yuan. (2) The “Implied Growth Rate” is 
the average annual continuously compounded growth rate between the beginning and the end of the sample period. For Urban 
NBS, the endpoints are 1987 and 2001; for Rural RCRE, the endpoints are 1987 and 2002; and for the CHNS, the endpoints are 
1991 and 2000. (3) See Tables 1 and 2 for further details. Figure 2: The Evolution of Inequality (the Gini Coefficient), Selected Years 
 






























Notes: (1) All calculations are based on real per capita household income, expressed in constant 1990 yuan. (2) See notes to 
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Notes: The Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF’s) are based on the urban (NSB) and rural (RCRE) data described in Table 1. All calculations are based on spatially-
undeflated, constant 1990 yuan. Figure 5: Wage-Employment By Age and Sex, Urban 
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Source: Authors calculations based on the CHNS Figure 7: Log Per Capita Household Income by Age 
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Source: Authors calculations based on the CHNS 